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I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1976 was not only the Bicentennial Celebration of the
United States of America. In certain respects, the year also marked
the celebration of effective demands for human dignity-demands
sharply articulated during the American and French Revolutions
and still reverberating. Thus,
1. In September 1976, 102 incumbent members of the United
States Congress-almost one-fifth-promulgated a "manifesto"
timed for the Presidential election calling upon all candidates for
public office to support the revision of United States foreign policy
in such a manner as to grant priority to human rights.'
2. During 1976, Congressman Donald M. Fraser's (D.-Minn.)
House Subcommittee on International Organizations completed
some 40 separate hearings on the status of human rights in 18
different nations.2
* The authors would like to express their thanks to the Office of Social Science Research
of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle for a transportation grant which made it possible
to interview key activists of the International League for Human Rights. Neither the OSSR
nor the ILHR, of course, is responsible for the interpretations, evaluations, judgments reached
in our article.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. B.A.,
1963, McGill University; M.Sc., 1965, University of London; Ph.D., 1973, University of California at Los Angeles.
*** Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. B.A., 1949,
Williams College; M.A., 1953, Ph.D., 1957, Yale University.
I Ottaway, The Growing Lobby for Human Rights, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1976, § B, at 1,
col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Ottaway].
With respect to Congressional review of the human rights situation in countries which
receive American military and economic assistance, late in 1976, Senate and House foreign
policy subcommittees requested the State Department to provide confidential United States
Embassy assessments and other State Department documents on the human rights practices
of some 19 nations. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, sought such information on the following nations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay; South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines;
Iran; Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mozambique and Zaire; India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; and Spain.
Representative Donald M. Fraser, Chairman of the International Relations Subcommittee on
International Organizations, is reported to have asked for similar State Department assess-
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3. In 1976, the State Department created an Office of Humanitarian Affairs at the staff level, and appointed human rights officers to State Department area desks. Reportedly, consideration
was also being given to the devolution of organizational concern for
human rights down to the embassy level, with the appointment of
in-country human rights officers.3
4. This same Bicentennial year, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and its Optional Protocol) entered into force.'
5. Between mid-1974 and the end of 1976, the United States
membership in Amnesty International (AI) (an international
human rights organization dedicated to the release of political
prisoners) grew from approximately 3,000 to 50,000.1
6. In September 1976, in an attempt to reconcile Western and
Third World conceptualizations of human rights, the International
Commission of Jurists (another international human rights organization, dedicated to upholding the rule of law), with the cosponsorship of President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, held a five-day seminar in Dar-es-Salaam on "Human Rights, Their Protection and the
Rule of Law in One-Party States."
7. A further recent development with respect to nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) was the creation of the Lawyers Committee
for International Human Rights, a joint undertaking of the International League for Human Rights and the Council of New York
Law Associates. The Lawyers Committee is a public interest lawyers' organization interested in the development of case law including "class action" intervention doctrines for the protection of
international human rights.
8. In March 1976, human rights panels at the International Studies Association generated enough interest to stimulate the creation
of an "internet" on international human rights, with a Newsletter
linking activists and scholars." '
ments on Argentina, Haiti and Peru. See Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19
Countries, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1976, § A, at 2, col. 1; US. and Latins: Violations of Rights
vs. Aid from Congress, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
Ottaway, supra note 1; Weinstein, State Dept. Eyes Human Rights, The Palladium
Times (Oswego, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1976.
1 See generally G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); Schwelb, Entry into Force of the InternationalCovenants on Human Rights and the
OptionalProtocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 70 AM. J. INT'L
L. 511 (1976); THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, A Report of the
Committee on Human Rights (The World Association of Lawyers 1976).
5 Ottaway, supra note 1, § B, at 5.
6 Wiseberg and Scoble edit this Newsletter for the Internet.
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In October 1976, the Ford Foundation Newsletter noted:
"In more countries than is generally realized, torture and
repression have become routine facts of life. Actors are
arrested for performing controversial plays; universities
are closed and scholars are expelled; scientists with unorthodox views are declared mentally ill; dissident journalists and student leaders are killed during police interrogation. . . . As grim acts multiply, the. issues of human
rights and intellectual freedom assume an urgent importance. The subject is a complex one involving not only the
protection of basic human rights and free expression of
ideas, but also a deeper understanding of the social processes that nurture or suppress freedom."

Hence, the Ford Foundation appropriated $500,000 for a program
intended to strengthen nongovernmental organizations working in
the field. Among the first grants awarded were funds for an internship program to aid human rights NGOs administered by the University of Minnesota, a grant to the International Commission of
Jurists for its Tanzania seminar, and support for the Index on
Censorship, which researches media censorship and publishes the
works of banned authors.'
10. Finally, in January of 1977, President Jimmy Carter in his
Inaugural Address mentioned human rights three times.
From the perspective of social scientists, a major issue posed by
these facts is that of substance or shadow: that is, do these facts
represent genuine growth in valuation of human dignity or do they
merely reflect the trendy, fadistic, "radical chic" of American
liberals? Stated differently, are human rights finally high on the
agenda of public and private policy-makers and likely to be an
enduring feature of United States politics?
While it is obvius that only a social historian can analyze this
question with some finality and after the lapse of sufficient time,
nonetheless the attempt at analysis now is important for two reasons: first, it can help to clarify our understanding of processes of
social and political change; and secondly, there is an intended byproduct of appraising alternative strategies for those dedicated to
the pursuit of a humane international order. Therefore, this article
is an initial response to the issue of substance or shadow.
A case study of the International League for Human Rights
FoRD FoUNDATMN Lumrr,

Oct. 1, 1976, at 1.
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(ILHR)-the oldest of the political interest groups devoted to the
protection of international human rights-will be used in order to
explore some dimensions of the apparent increased political salience
of these values. Although it is probably less well known than either
Amnesty International or the International Commission of Jurists,
the other two major human rights NGOs, nevertheless the ILHR is
distinct from (as well as older than) those two organizations in that
it is uniquely devoted to the full range of human rights. While
Amnesty International is concerned primarily with political prisoners and torture and the International Commission of Jurists cuts
into the human rights field through its dedication to the rule of law,
the International League takes the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,'0 in its entirety, as its platform.
The League is now 34 years old and for most of its existence has
confined its activities to international lawmaking with the United
Nations as its most prominent arena. However, in the last few years,
accelerating changes in the human rights field have forced the
League to search for new strategies through which it could become
both more relevant and more efficient. These strategies are examined below.

II.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

The International League for Human Rights traces its origins to
a French citizens' league created to monitor and criticize actions of
the French government; that is, it was a response to the Dreyfus
case, French antisemitism, an especially Emile Zola's famous literary protest couched in the natural law prose of Tom Paine and the
French Revolution. This Ligue Franqaise pour la DMfense des Droits
de L'Homme et du Citoyen early became a general civil libertarian
association, and grew rapidly from its inception in 1902 until its
peak just prior to World War I, at which point it claimed somewhere
between 200,000 and 300,000 French members (somewhat larger
than the American Civil Liberties Union in the mid-1970's). The
French Ligue also encouraged the formation of similar organizations
Formerly the International League for the Rights of Man; the organization formally
changed its name in March 1976.
1 For a discussion of Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists
see Note, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in
Latin America, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. at 481-84.
10G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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elsewhere in Europe (e.g., Germany, Spain, Portugal, but not the
U.K.) and in the French colonial possessions (e.g., Tonkin, Martinique, and French Guyana), which were loosely affiliated through
an international federation founded in 1922-the Federation Internationale des Droits de L'Homme.
Roger Nash Baldwin, a major founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (as the National Bureau on Civil Liberties in
1919), was in Paris in 1927 and was permitted to sit on the Central
Committee of the French League as a foreign observer. Throughout
the interwar period, Baldwin maintained his interest in and contacts with the organization and, when World War II effectively destroyed the League by dispersing many of its members, Baldwin
encouraged the reconstitution of the group by French 6migr6s.
Thus, in 1942, the International League for the Rights of Man was
incorporated under the laws of New York State, though it continued
to conduct all proceedings in French. Among the key refounders
were the following: Henri Laugier, Director of Cultural Relations in
DeGaulle's wartime government, the man who played a key role in
organizing the departure of scientists from Nazi-occupied France,
and subsequently United Nations Assistant Secretary General for
Social Affairs; Henri Bonnet, formerly French ambassador to the
United States; Charles Malik, formerly Foreign Minister of Lebanon and subsequently Chairman of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights; Boris M. Gutzevitch, a Russian naturalized in
France who was close to the Secretary General of the U.N. and
edited the U.N. Yearbook; Max Beer, a German Jewish refugee and
major correspondent at the United Nations, chairman of the U.N.
journalists; and other European refugees."
The reconstitution of the League was auspicious in that it occurred in the wake of the declaration of Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" in January 1941,12 the Roosevelt/Churchill Atlantic Charter
" Information concerning the League's early years is based on an interview with Roger

Nash Baldwin, Dec. 1976, New York. See also P. LAMSON,

ROGER BALDWIN-FOUNDER OF THE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: A PORTRAIT (1976).
12
The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere

in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way-everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want-which, translated into world terms, means
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life
for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear-which, translated into world terms, means a
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promise of a new international "structure of peace" emerging from
the final destruction of Naziism, and the January 1942 United Nations Declaration, whereby 26 countries pledged themselves to reestablish a collective security organization. And, indeed, from the
outset, the International League-headquartered in New
York-regarded the United Nations as the principal arena for its
interests and energies. Its initial efforts were directed to ensuring
that the United Nations Charter explicitly recognized the relation
of international human rights to world peace. League members,
working in cooperation with representatives of other similarly concerned NGOs, "lobbied" the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco
delegations in this cause. Encouraged by its early successes-the
U.N. Charter contains seven specific references to human rights; a
Commission on Human Rights was established which assumed as
its first task the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; and prominent Americans, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, lent
their support to the human rights cause-and by Baldwin's inspirational faith in the world forum, the League continued its focus on
positive lawmaking and the United Nations for close to 30 years.
In the 1950's, and especially in the 1960's, the League considered
the decolonization process as a crucial aspect of the human rights
struggle and championed the independence of Afro-Asian states.
With consultative standing in the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) of the United Nations as well as in the ILO and
UNESCO, the League closely monitored human rights developments in the U.N. chambers and discreetly pressured for the adoption of pro-human rights declarations and covenants. While it is
not possible, given the current state of development of the social
sciences, to quantify separately the impact of the League when it
and a multiplicity of other forces (e.g., other human rights NGOs,
national governments, international governmental organizations,
insurgency movements, etc.) are all working for the same objective,
nevertheless it is evident that the League has been a prime mover
in international lawmaking with regard to human rights. Its accomworld-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion
that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against
any neighbor-anywhere in the world.
ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY 1933-1941: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S UNEDITED SPEECHES AND
MESSAGES 324 (W. Funk, Inc. comp. 1942).
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plishments during these decades were solid and substantial. 3 Indeed, one can conclude that the efforts of the League, taken together
with the efforts of others working for the codification of international human rights law, were sufficiently successful and exhaustive
so that the organization now finds itself in a paradoxical position:
it has accomplished its original objectives, yet human rights remain
threatened throughout the world. That is to say, little or nothing
can be accomplished through further positive lawmaking on the
subject; the issue today is the problem of effective implementation.
However, prior to more detailed examination of "problematic success," it is necessary to analyze some of the structural characteristics of the organization.
I.

ANATOMY OF THE LEAGUE'

4

A political interest group may be usefully analyzed in several
different ways: it is a formal organization but also a set of informal
interactions among persons; it is an enunciated ideology and operational code with regard to strategy and tactics; it is a relationship
between leadership and membership; and it is a set of activities
which social scientists seek to describe accurately and evaluate with
regard to impact.
The International League for Human Rights is a nongovernmental, nonpartisan political organization; it has never knowingly received money from any government, nor has any government
funded its projects. Supported wholly through voluntary contributions, the League has essentially two categories of members: contributing members numbering about 2,000, each of whom pays an
annual $10 membership fee; and affiliate members, human rights
groups around the world (of which there are now 38) whose affilia11The authors have not done an indepth study of the League's history. However, a student
interested in undertaking such an historical study will find all of the League's papers (documents, reports, correspondence, etc.) deposited in the New York City Library.
1, Information about the structure and current activities of the International League has
been derived from a number of sources: interviews with the League's Executive Director,
Robert Cohen, and the League's Chairman, Jerome J. Shestack, December 1976, New York,
and earlier written and oral communications with them; Annual Reports of the League;
Minutes of the League's Board of Directors; the League Bulletin; and special reports and
press releases of the organization. Brief descriptions of the ILHR are also found in Archer,
Action by Unofficial Organizations on Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
160 (E. Luard ed. 1967); Stewart, The InternationalLeague for the Rights of
HUMAN Rirs
Man, 1975 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (No. 1) 61.
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tion with the League has been approved by the ILHR's Board of
Directors, and which may, though not so obliged, financially support League activities. Until the late 1960's, the League operated on
a tiny budget-$15,000 in 1967-and it was only after it received a
bequest of $100,000 the following year that the League hired a full
time Executive Director and expanded its budget to $40,000.'1
In many respects, the ILHR was initially patterned on the model
of the early ACLU. Both organizations were, of course, strongly
influenced by the dynamic personality of Roger Nash Baldwin. The
ACLU was deliberately created and maintained-at least until after
World War II-as a small, private, informally-organized staff organization. This accorded with Roger Baldwin's social philosophy and
operational ideology, drawn from 19th century concepts of noblesse
oblige and private charitable service, influenced no doubt by Baldwin's early career as a social worker in St. Louis. Recruitment was
mainly by an "old boy" network of those known to and trusted by
those already in the organization. The emphasis was on discreet and
indirect political action, through an exclusive focus on and singleminded faith in the efficacy of the federal judicial process.
"Members" existed solely to supply financial contributions to sustain the professional activities of the legal staff. In like manner, the
League was also maintained as a small, private, very informallyorganized and almost "social" group.
This early form that the ILHR assumed has both advantages and
disadvantages. As to the former, the method of recruitment ensures
that an underlying consensus is built into the organization. This
minimization of conflict (both between leadership and membership
and within the leadership elite) permits organizational flexibility
and speed in decision making. However, a political interest group
based upon this model suffers important disabilities, the main one
being lack of resources. That is, to be effective, an interest group
generally requires either mass membership or money, which often
can serve as a substitute for sheer numbers. Influence may, of
course, derive from the skills and high status of the membership
which in fact were the resources with which the early League
achieved its positive lawmaking successes. Yet these resources can
,* Currently, the League operates with a regular budget of about $50,000. Exceptional
expenses-e.g., to send League observers on foreign missions-are covered by special fundraising events.
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carry a group only so far. If our assessment is correct-that the
problem of human rights has shifted away from legislation to the
sphere of implementation, and if national governments are the key
to solving the problem of implementation, i.e., in the last analysis,
human rights are protected or violated by national legislation and
the behavior of national elites'-then a political group which consciously remains small, informal, and private forfeits the opportunity for maximal political effectiveness. It is precisely this problem
that the League began to confront in the late 1960's with the expansion of its budget, the appointment of fulltime paid staff, the numerical increase and elaboration of its Board of Directors and its
International Advisory Committee, and experimentation with new
strategies of action.
In terms of anatomical structure, there is a unique feature to the
International League which has significantly conditioned the search
for relevant and effective strategies. In contradistinction to other
human rights NGOs, at one level, the League is a confederation of
functioning national civil libertarian organizations. Very much in
keeping with the ideology of the old French Ligue, the ILHR, reconstituted in the United States, sought a similar role in organizationbuilding. Thus, Baldwin's desire to create civil liberties interest
groups (patterned on the ACLU model) abroad was readily manifested in League activities; Baldwin personally helped establish
such groups in Japan, Germany and Korea after World War II, with
the support of the United States government. And, over the thirtyodd years of its existence, the internationalquality of the League
has derived not merely from its objective in elaborating a corpus of
international human rights law, but especially from its aspiration
to help create and sustain functioning effective civil liberties organizations in national societies. Therefore, League affiliates are not just
chapters or sections of the League in diverse countries; the 38
League affiliates are, 7 at least theoretically, established civil liber' See H. Scoble & L. Wiseberg, The Policy Impact of International Human Rights Interest
Groups: A Reassessment (unpublished paper presented to a conference on International
Scientific and Professional Associations and the International System, University of Pennsylvania, Nov. 12-13, 1976); Human Rights NGOs: Notes Toward Comparative Analysis, 9
HUMAN RIGHTS. J. (No. 4) (1976).
'7 The number of affiliates is constantly in flux as some groups die out or are repressed by
political regimes, others emerge and seek League affiliation, or occasionally a group may be
disaffiliated by the ILHR. For example, in recent years, the League disaffiliated an Israeli
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ties groups working for the furtherance of human rights in their own
societies. League support for these affiliates is a clear reflection of
its belief that the principal protection of human rights must come
through the effective implementation of national law, i.e., national
legislation must be brought into line with international human
rights standards.
Theory and practice are not always, of course, consonant, and
an examination of the League's affiliates raises questions about organizational ideology and rhetoric. The League affiliates constitute
something of a "hodge-podge" of diverse groups and diverse relations with the ILHR. A few-like the ACLU, the Irish Association
of Civil Liberty, or the Canadian Civil Liberties Associationclearly fit the criteria of nongovernmental, human rights, activist
organizations oriented towards extending and protecting civil
liberties in their own countries; but others are less clearly so categorized. For example, two United States-based affiliates, the American Committee on Africa and the Inter-American Association for
Democracy and Freedom, are oriented to human rights problems
abroad, rather than at home. So, too, are the Minority Rights Group
or the Anti-Slavery Society (both London based) which one would
characterize more as research operations than activist associations.
Similarly, the Center for Civil Rights of the University of Notre
Dame is better understood as an academic clearing house rather
than on a par with the Bangladesh Human Rights Society. In considering the latter association it is not entirely clear whether there
is an effective membership organization behind the letterhead.
The problem of the League's affiliates can be approached from a
somewhat different angle. If one considers their geographic distribution, there is a highly skewed representation: 8 are North American
(seven based in the United States); 12 are West European; only
two-a Mexican and a Jamaican group-are Latin American; only
two-a South African and a Mauritian group-are African, certainly not a representative African sample; there is only one Middle
group which became involved in litigation over the question of the control of the organization.
There was an additional incentive for this drastic move of disaffiliation in the fact that the
Israeli organization, using the League's name, tended to make highly provocative and contentious statements about the violation of human rights in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory.
According to the League's bylaws, no affiliate can speak in the name of the International
League, nor is the ILHR responsible for the actions or pronouncements of its affiliates.
Nonetheless, since the credibility of the League can be jeopardized by irresponsible affiliate
behavior, the organization reserves the power of disaffiliation.
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Eastern group, the International League for the Rights of Man in
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and the Asian groups-in New
Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, Bangladesh
and Pakistan-are largely in the Western capitalist sphere. There
is only one League affiliate from the Communist world, the Moscow
Human Rights Committee, a group whose special relationship with
the League will be explored below. What this implies, at least indirectly, is that the League has not been highly successful in its
early objective of trying to stimulate the creation of civil liberties
groups abroad.
Hence, to explain the Western bias in both the geographic and
political regime distribution of its affiliates, the League must admit
that few nongovernmental human rights groups exist in either Third
World or Communist World countries. Sometimes they exist as opposition groups in exile, but the League has understandably been
reluctant to affiliate such groups for fear that they will draw the
League directly into the partisan politics of other states. Hence,
even relaxing the criteria for affiliate status-and, of course, it
should be noted that the League does not possess any investigatory
means for testing whether applicant groups really are nongovernmental, actively functioning, and pro-human rights-the biases in
League affiliates are glaring. Perhaps what this reflects most clearly
is the difficulty the League has faced in trying to be both an American organization and an international coalition. Outside Western or
Western-oriented countries, interest group structures have not been
elaborated in the American fashion. This is, to some extent, compensated for by an informal mechanism whereby the League accepts
"correspondents" in countries where it does not have affiliates.
However, while "correspondents" may provide the League with access to information on events and developments in "closed" societies, this is not the same as having an organizational affiliate link.
One final point should be here noted about the League structure.
In the League's Annual Report, in its statements and special studies, and in the composition of its Board of Directors and International Advisory Committee, the League could generally be characterized as Western/"liberal" in terms of ideology. Neither its membership nor its officers reflect a single partisan political philosophy
or a single professional occupational category, although both its
membership and support clearly derive from the educated, scientific/professional/artistic middle and upper strata of society, with
the time and discretionary income to devote to international poli-
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tics. While the League frequently takes up the cause of "the oppressed masses"-the plight of the Ache Indians of Paraguay, selfdetermination and racial justice for the Namibians, the Zimbabweans and the South Africans, the cause of political prisoners in
Indonesia, Iran or India-the League is itself an elite organization.
It is neither "mass membership" nor does it seek to be a radical
leader of the mass. 8 Additionally, while the effect of the League's
successful interventions is to preserve the possibility for the emergence of a genuine counter elite, the League itself is not that counter
elite.
11Indeed, a more detailed analysis of the membership, and especially the affiliates of the
League would reveal few "radicals" and a relatively high tolerance of a "conservative" prohuman rights position. For example, while the League's Board of Directors took a clear
position not to endorse the report of Frances R. Grant-Secretary General of the League's
affiliate, the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, (IADF) and for many
years a League Board member-following her visit to Chile 2 months after the overthrow of
President Allende, the Board made no effort to dissuade Ms. Grant from publishing the
substance of the report in the editorials of Hemispherica.Those editorials in the organ of the
IADF made the incredible argument that the military in Chile had acted to overthrow Allende
only as a last resort to forestall an armed invasion/internal putsch by Castroite extremist
forces: the "Z" plan! That is, Allende is alleged by Frances Grant to have had a secret
army-"massive para-military cohorts, both Chilean and the approximately 13,000 foreign
recruits"-and to have secretly smuggled in and hidden vast caches of arms-"calculated as
sufficient to equip a force of 30,000." Grant further alleged that news of violations of human
rights in the Chile of the junta seemed little more than "massive propaganda which was being
circulated worldwide, in great part by the advocates of the Allende government;" that while
she could not speak for the period immediately following the overthrow, "for the period of
my own testimony, I must refute the stories of peremptory killings and arrests; burnings of
books; freedom of movement." Moreover, with respect to alleged earlier atrocities, "I have
never been able to get confirming evidence, either from the journalists who had sent the
stories, or from such prestigious international organizations as . . . the International Red
Cross, the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees, the religious rescue organizations of every
denomination." See 22 HEMISPHERICA (Nos. 9, 10) (1973). Only in February 1974 did Frances
Grant, along with others in the United States Committee of IADF, "deplore the establishment of a de facto military regime in Chile." See 23 HEMISPHERICA (No. 2) (1974). Yet the
International League saw no reason for disaffiliating the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom.
In like manner, the ILHR is currently considering the possibility of affiliation for Freedom
House, an organization whose "Comparative Survey of Freedom" program, instituted in 1972
"to monitor the status of freedom in the nations of the world on an objective basis," would
place it on the ultra-right end of the political spectrum (emppasis added). That is, its mindless use of quantitative indicators leads one to such an ultra-right conclusion, as there is
greater enjoyment of political and civil rights in the Republic of South Africa than there is
in Tanzania, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau-indeed, than in most black African states. The
United States is, of course, in the "most free" rank while China and Cuba are in the "least
free." See Gastril, The Comparative Survey of Freedom-VI, FREEDOM AT ISSUE, Jan.-Feb.
1976, at 11.
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IV. FAILURE OF HOPE: THE ILHR AND THE UNITED NATIONS
In the 1973 Annual Report of the International League, its present
Chairman, Jerome J. Shestack, assessed the first 25 years experience with the Universal Declaration in the following sombre terms.
At the U.N., the Commission on Human Rights has shown an
inability to deal effectively, indeed, deal at all with human rights
violations. Egregious complaints from individuals and groups have
been ignored for political reasons. No effective action has been
taken on such vital matters as religious intolerance, the repression
of freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the rights of noncitizens, abuse of the administration of justice. Non-governmental
organizations are frustrated and even harassed in their efforts to
redress these violations before the U.N."0
Against this background, the League began a reassessment of its

primary strategy of focusing on the U.N. as its main political arena.
Disillusionment with the United Nations derived from several
concrete sources. One was the fact that, despite considerable NGO
pressure, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (which,
together with its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, is the focal human rights body
of the U.N.) has, thus far, failed to make effective use of the procedures established in 1970 by ECOSOC Resolution 15030 for reviewing situations which reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably

attested violations of human rights. Throughout the 1950's and
much of the 1960's, the International League lived with the incredible situation arising from the decision of the Commission, at its very
first sessions in 1947, that neither it nor its Sub-Commission had
power to take any action in regard to any compliance concerning
human rights in the expectation that it could help effect a change
in the status quo. And, indeed, in 1966-67, the Commission began
retreating from this self-abnegating position. The breakthrough
came, first, with respect to southern Africa: ECOSOC, which sets
the mandate of the Commission, decided in 1967 that both the
Commission and its Sub-Commission could "in appropriate cases,
. . .make a thorough study of situations which reveal a consistent
pattern of violations of human rights, as exemplified by the policy
"' INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT 1.

" E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).
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of apartheid as practised in [South Africa and Namibia] .
".2..,
Then, in May 1970, the power of the Commission to investigate
situations "which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms" was generalized by ECOSOC Resolution 1503,22 and provisional rules were subsequently established for dealing with the question of the admissibility of complaints. Yet all these efforts have
proven to be rather empty legal exercises. Since the passage of Resolution 1503, not a single case of gross human rights violations has
made it through the procedural labyrinth to reach the stage of open
discussion and recommendation by the Commission. As of this date,
the only cases of gross violations to be treated by the United Nations
remaining are southern Africa, Chile, and Israel's treatment of persons in the Occupied Territories-and none of these has come
24
through 1503 channels.
At about this same time, it became evident that the United Nations Human Rights Commission-toothless as it was with regard
to its presumed primary function-was not without power to sanction effectively human rights NGOs themselves. This practical
demonstration occurred in 1974-75 and concerned the manner in
which NGOs could present information on alleged violations in conformance with their consultative status with the ECOSOC. Consultative status, Category B-which the League and other human
rights NGOs have-is bestowed on organizations which have particular competence in, and are concerned specifically with, a limited
segment of the ECOSOC's work. The status permits NGOs to send
observers to public meetings, submit memoranda, and make oral
statements to such bodies as the Commission and Sub" E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 17, 17-18, U.N. Doc. E/4393(1967). For
a more detailed treatment of the record of the Commission on Human Rights see Hoare, The
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 59
(E. Luard ed. 1967); THE UNITED NATIONS AS PROTECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS 524-26, 539-43, 739856 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973); Weinstein, Africa's Approach to Human Rights
at the Unite Nations, IssuE, Winter 1976, at 15.
22 E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).
21 With regard to the procedures for Resolution 1503 see G. GA FONSECA, How TO FILE
COMPLAINTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
PROCEDURES (World Council of Churches 1975).
2 For example, Chile has been treated by an ad hoc working group of the Commission,
established in 1975. See generally, U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REVIEw: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,

June 1976, at 24.
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Commission.2

Until recently, the ECOSOC did not clearly enunciate its rules of
parliamentary order, but convention and habit ensured that NGOs
would "address" the issues of violations of human rights and their
violators with circumlocutions, euphemisms, and evasions. In February 1974, however, the unwritten rule against "naming names"
was broken when Mrs. Salvadore Allende, widow of the slain Chilean President, was invited to address the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. She spoke as a representative of the
Women's International Democratic Federation, an organization
headquartered in East Berlin. In a highly emotional tone, Mrs. Allende gave a detailed description of the low status of human rights
in Chile under Pinochet, asking the Commission to condemn the
military junta for "genocidal repression." 2 No one interrupted Mrs.
Allende to object or invoke a Roberts-type rule calling her to order.
Observing this, Dr. Homer A. Jack, representing the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), seized upon the opportunity
to present a "state of the world"/human rights status report, with
empirical detail about victims and violators. The following day,
Professor Frank C. Newman from Amnesty International made very
detailed charges about torture in Chile.?
Moreover, a few months later-in May 1974-the executive director of yet another human rights NGO, Niall MacDermot of the
International Commission of Jurists, wrote an article for a special
human rights section of the London Times in which he similarly
violated the nation-protecting diplomatic protocol. Specifically,
MacDermot dealt with real-world, real-time events, regimes and
peoples by discussing the eight cases of consistent patterns of gross
violations then under investigation by the Working Group of the
Commission on Human Rights.a The culmination of this series of
NGO "indiscretions" came at the 31st session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in February 1975. At that meeting,
Dr. Homer Jack of the WCRP spoke out forcefully once again, this
time addressing the question of religious persecution. He spoke of
5 See generally E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548
(1967).
2S Allende's Widow Appeals to UN., N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirtieth Session, 4-8 Mar. 1974, 56 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 30, U.N. Doc. E/5464 E/CN.4/l154 (1974).
' The Times (London), May 21, 1974 (12 page special report).
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the disappointment "to the point of disillusionment" at the continued lack of progress in elaborating a convention against religious
intolerance, and proceeded with an inventory of denials of religious
freedom in a plethora of states."
The nationalist reaction was self-righteously defensive and
strong; the NGOs had no right to speak thusly to powers of the
world. Immediately after Jack's delivery, five members of the Commission (Egypt, Pakistan, Soviet Union, Turkey and Zaire) and two
observer states (Philippines and Syria) exerted their right of reply,
claiming that Jack's statements about their states were untrue or
slanderous or biased. 0 Subsequently, the Egyptian delegate put on
record the following amplification:
We are extremely concerned about the abuse of freedom of speech
practiced by some representatives of nongovernmental organizations. This particular statement recently delivered by the World
Conference on Religion and Peace should not appear in the summary records of this Commission. Indeed, its status should be restudied by the Economic and Social Council. During the past two
sessions this organization has made such statements. Their status
should be reconsidered in accordance with ECOSOC Resolution
1296 (XLIV). [This resolution relates to arrangements for NGO
consultative status.]3'
Then, in private session, the Commission on Human Rights requested the ECOSOC to take measures that would impose severe
restrictions on the nature of NGO communications about human
rights violations, whether those communications were to the U.N.
or in the form of public statements. Consequently, the ECOSOC
was to lay down the rules: when NGOs made complaints or allegations of human rights violations, such statements were to be dealt
with "not under the rules of consultative status but under the decisions concerning the inclusion of such material in confidential lists
of communications prepared for the Commission on Human Rights
.... ,32 Therefore, with respect both to their own complaints and
other information they became aware of as a result of their partici2

Jack, The Human Rights Commission at Geneva, WCRP

REPORT,

Mar. 7, 1975, at 3, 3-

5 (World Conference on Religion and Peace).
" Id. at 5-7.
m Id. at 7.
12 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-First Session, 3 Feb.-7 Mar. 1975,
58 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), U.N. Doc. E/5635 E/CN.4/1179 (1975).
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pation in U.N. deliberations, NGOs could not publicly disclose this
material unless and until the Human Rights Commission made a
recommendation to the ECOSOC.33 Moreover:
Having been made aware by the Commission . . . that some nongovernmental organizations have occasionally failed to observe the
requirements of confidentiality . . . and having been made aware
further that the oral interventions of some non-governmental organizations on matters affecting Member States have often shown
disregard for proper discretion,
the ECOSOC
Decides that any non-governmental organization failing to show
proper discretion in an oral or written statement may render itself
subject to suspension of its consultative status . . .3
The outcome was doubly disappointing to the League in that many
of the NGOs-even including human rights NGOs-absolutely refused to band together to protest and protect themselves and their
alleged constituents from these rataliatory actions.35
Some close U.N. observers also consider there to be a linkage
between a third U.N. development and the sanctioning of NGOs:
i.e., the recent removal of the Human Rights Division of the U.N.
from New York to Geneva. Additionally, the General Assembly's
Committee on Conferences recently voted that all sessions of the
Commission and Sub-Commission would be held in Geneva. This
decision reversed a long-standing practice of alternating sessions
between New York and Geneva.3 1 One can speculate about the effects of these acts, but a primary consequence would seem to be the
isolation of the entire subject matter of human rights from the nerve
center of the U.N. system. The move is perceived by key activists,
such as Jerome Shestack, as placing human rights on "the back
burner." Additionally, since human rights NGOs increasingly draw
13 See E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 9, para. 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add.1 (1970).
"' Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-First Session, 3-7 Mar. 1975, 58
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4) 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/5635 E/CN.4/1179 (1975).
" The grounds for refusing to cooperate in self-defense, according to Robert Cohen, were
that it would destroy the claimed "credibility" of the human rights NGOs with the Commission on Human Rights-yet to have credibility with a noneffective governmental agency
would seem a hollow political status indeed.
A NGO Working Paper on Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in the Field of
Human Rights 5 (Jan. 1, 1977) (mimeo, New York).
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their members and financial support from United States citizens,
the transfer will penalize NGOs both directly and indirectly. It will
directly increase the cost of operational representation; concurrently, it will make it more difficult for Americans to center their
vision on human rights matters. Obviously the United States press
will pay even less attention to non-United States events such as
human rights violations when the source of information is Geneva
rather than New York.
Finally, with respect to disillusionment with the United Nations,
one must cite the 1975 General Assembly Resolution equating Zionism with Racism.3 7 All Western-based human rights NGOs have
been deeply disturbed by this event, regarded by them as a blatant
example of the "politicization" of human rights; many, like the
League, formally dissociated themselves from that U.N. declaration. The Zionism resolution, perhaps, was the gelling point of many
NGO frustrations with the U.N. system:
Some have questioned the "selective morality" or double standard
of the U.N. in criticizing violations of human rights only in certain
political areas of the world when such problems are virtually
worldwide. Others have pointed to the politicization of the handling of human rights issues by both the General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights. They feel that human rights issues
should not be evaluated primarily by extraneous political criteria.
Still a third criticism of the U.N. in this field is that emphasis has
been given to promoting economic, social, and cultural rights while
often neglecting civil and political rights, or diluting or perverting
the standards. A fourth criticism is the lack of general standards
of fair procedures for all situations.
Thus, the League has been involved in a major reassessment of the
U.N. as the principal forum for human rights.
V.

REAPPRAISAL OF STRATEGIES

In terms of organizational biography, disillusionment with the
United Nations and the former League focus on lawmaking coincided with the elaboration of the organizational structure, increase
in the budget, and expansion of the Board of Directors of the
37 G.A. Res. 3379, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).

A NGO Working Paper on Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in the Field of
Human Rights 1 (Jan. 1, 1977) (mimeo, New York).

1977]

INT'L LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

League. Thus, in the early 1970's, the ILHR became concerned with
defining for itself a new role in effective human rights implementation, as well as with differentiating itself from other human rights
NGOs. As Roberta Cohen, Executive Director of the League, has
characterized the process, the organization has been engaged in a
search for a new methodology.
One of the first attempts to engage in more meaningful and innovative activism grew out of the existing League strategy of supporting national-legal affiliates. In June 1971, the Board of Directors of
the ILHR after intense debate took the unprecedented step of affiliating with a Soviet organization. The Moscow Human Rights Committee was founded in November 1970 by three Russian scientists-Andrei D. Sakharov, A.N. Tverdokhlebov and V.N. Chalidze.
These were later joined by a handful of other Soviet dissidents, such
as Litvinov. "A creative association acting in conformity with the
laws of the state," the purposes of the Committee were specified as
including assistance to state authorities in creating and applying
safeguards for human rights, help for persons who research and
study human rights in a socialist society, legal education in the
field, and "constructive criticism of the present state of the Soviet
system of legal safeguards for individual freedom.""9 Although
hardly a civil libertarian organization in the Western sense of a legal
interest group, the fact that the Committee was openly and
"legally" established and that it was seeking international support
prompted the League to favor affiliation. Fears of League Board
members that there would be reprisals against Committee members
in Moscow were assuaged by the insistence of Russian dissidents
that publicity could only strengthen their position-that silence
helped no one.40
This, nonetheless, imposed a special responsibility upon the
ILHR-to protect as well as to support the members of the Moscow
Principles of the Human Rights Committee in PROCEEDINGS OF THE Moscow HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMrrEE 11-12 (International League for the Rights of Man 1972). See generally
Forward, in SAKHAROV SPEAKS 3 (H. Salisbury ed. 1974).
,*It is, perhaps, important to note here that a group like the Moscow Human Rights
Committee is not an anti-Communist organization. That is, Sakharov, Chalidze and Tverdokhlevob (the latter two now in the United States and editing A Chronicleof Human Rights
in the USSR, a quarterly published by Khronika Press and morally supported by the League)
think of themselves as "legalists," admonishing the Soviet authorities for violations of their
own 1936 Constitution which speaks very eloquently to the issue of human rights for Soviet
citizens.
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Human Rights Committee (MHRC). Thus, the League instituted
weekly phone calls to the members in Moscow both to assure their
well-being and to keep apprised of Soviet developments; it undertook to publish the proceedings of the MHRC, to disseminate
samizdat publications, and to transmit information received from
the Committee to the U.N., the press, and other relevant publics;
and it gave high priority to lobbying the Soviet government when
the lives or health of human rights activists were threatened by
imprisonment or incarceration in mental institutions. The International League's initiative was subsequently followed in September
1974, when the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International decided to recognize the formation of an AI group in
Moscow. 4
A second experiment in strategy arises from the fact that, as the
oldest international human rights NGO, the League has received an
increasing number of complaints of alleged violations of human
rights sent by individuals and organizations throughout the world,
currently about 1,000 such complaints annually. Since the League
does not have the research and verification manpower and competence that Amnesty International has established with respect to
political prisoners, nor does it have the legal-professional and jurisprudential prestige of the limited-membership International Commission of Jurists, the League has sought to develop its own style
of response to a small sample of these unsolicited complaints. Reference here is to the Lawyer's Committee on International Human
Rights, a joint effort begun in 1976 by the International League and
the Council of New York Law Associates, a group of some 1,600
young "public interest" lawyers of the New York City area. By the
end of the year the Lawyers' Committee had enlisted some 35 young
attorneys; it had held three training sessions on international
human rights law, on the United Nations and NGOs, and on new
United States legislation on human rights; and it was generally
experimenting with efforts to fulfill the felt need for "class action"
intervention doctrines.
The Lawyers' Committee's efforts, thus far, have been impressive: reuniting an American Peace Corps worker and her Afghan
husband; filing the written 73-page complaint with the United Nations concerning torture in Indian jails and publicizing this com41 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

1974-1975

ANNUAL REPORT

119 (1975).
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plaint in Western media; suing the United States Postal Service for
reimbursement for costs of undelivered mail sent to the Soviet
Union; specialization in the procedures for monitoring the 1975 Helsinki Accord's "third basket" on human rights; and publicity, petitioning and pressures to secure the release from jail of Srdja Popovic, a Yugoslav attorney sentenced by the Yugoslav courts for
having conducted the legal defense of a Yugoslav political dissident.
In all of these cases, the young attorney can claim to have become
an expert (possibly the expert) in the legal and political procedures
involved. Moreover, these cases all reflect the organization's search
for techniques of effective implementation of human rights legislation.
A final form of experimentation has recently been under consideration by the League, though the Board has not yet approved the
strategy. This concerns the possibility of targeting League pressure
on such multilateral funding agencies as the World Bank or the
IMF, on such American funding agencies as the Export-Import
Bank, and perhaps even on multinational corporations, especially
American multinationals. Other human rights NGOs have engaged
in such action; for example, church groups and American black
NGOs have tried to curtail the flow of both aid and investment to
the white regimes in southern Africa by such pressure. However,
when the League's Board considered the transmission of a resolution
asking that the World Bank deny a pending loan request to Paraguay on the grounds of political repression by the military, genocide
of the Ache Indians, political corruption and narcotics trafficking by
or on the part of the ruling elite to Robert McNamara, President of
the Bank, it was a new departure for the League.
Simultaneously, the League has engaged in nonexclusive and traditional strategies: the sending of observers to political trials (e.g.,
Claude-Armand Sheppard represented both the League and the International Commission of Jurists at the trial of the Ananda Marga
leader in India in 1976); the dispatch of special missions to conduct
on-site investigations of selected human rights situations (e.g., the
League Mission of former Ambassador Ben Stephansky and Rutgers
Professor Robert J. Alexander, to Paraguay in mid-1976); and, increasingly, the staging of political-social events as political fundraisers for such extra-budgetary costs. The League has also engaged
in the preparation of in-depth reports on priority issues and, when
requested, has prepared detailed reviews of human rights violations
for such congressional committees as Congressman Fraser's Sub-
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committee on International Organizations.
While the expertise and legitimacy of human rights NGOs like the
International League or Amnesty International have given them
privileged access to such committees, and to the Senators and Congressmen who concern themselves most with human rights, the
League does not engage in lobbying within the meaning of Title I
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and subsequent federal
court decisions interpreting that "Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act."4 That is, the League never lobbies for or against specific
domestic legislation. This notwithstanding, the League does act to
shape the effective climate of political opinion in the United States
and, through this indirect manner, it acts to ensure that elite behavior will be in accordance with the League's pro-human rights preferences.
VI.

APPRAISING EFFECTIVENESS

Any attempt to appraise both the short-term impact and the longrange effectiveness of League strategies brings one back to the issue
of shadow versus substance mentioned in the introduction. The
League, like almost every single political interest group with which
we are familiar, lacks both the resources and the expertise to conduct objective evaluations of its own activities. Additionally, it is
unable to engage in long-term planning bedause the human rights
field is an endemic crisis situation relative to the few pro-human
rights groups and their terribly limited resources. Consequently, an
organization such as the League is guided by hope and faith and
such crude indicators of their effectiveness as quantity and quality
of press clippings about League activities. On the other hand, the
social science researcher cannot avoid the obligation of attempting
an independent assessment. In this endeavor there are two extreme
dangers: the first is the easy equation of activity with influence; the
second is to adopt an inappropriate scientific stance-"if it cannot
be counted, it does not exist"-thus denying that such groups have
any intended impact. Bearing these dangers in mind, what can one
conclude?
For the first 25 years of the League's existence and taking its
proclaimed primary function at face value, the League was highly
effective. Evidence for this is found in the substantial corpus of
2

2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1970).
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international law on human rights drafted since World War II.1'
However, in examining the organization's shift to its present
focus-that of implementation-we have a much more complex
problem of evaluation. Tentatively, the League, as one important
constituent of a pro-human rights "movement" has been successful
in putting human rights on the agenda of United States politics.
Agenda setting is, of course, the classical strategy of interest groups
in American politics-it makes little difference which party wins a
political election so long as one can monopolize the office holders'
focus of attention. But the test still lies in the future. In the Bicentennial and American Presidential election year of 1976, the ILHR
and other human rights NGOs have been able to make human rights
concerns politically salient, as evidenced in the descriptive enumeration with which this article began. Yet it is by no means clear that
human rights concerns can retain their high ranking position in a
changed environment entailing conflict with national economic
goals. For example, if the world economic situation were to deteriorate even further, so that United States-based multinational corporations could persuasively argue to the American electorate that an
excessive "bleeding-heart liberal" concern with human rights is
costing the nation external markets, sources of raw materials, and
arenas for investment, then it is by no means certain that human
rights groups could retain control over the policy-makers' agenda.
Furthermore, if one expands one's perspective beyond the borders
of the United States, 1976 did not exhibit so nearly favorable a
climate for human rights concerns. The military coup in Argentina
has been followed by concrete evidence of an emerging continental
cooperation of the political police in Latin America." In Uruguay
and Chile, the regimes of torture and terror continue such that the
United States Congress permitted no military assistance or sales to
those nations. 5 Recent information on Iran indicates that their se"3See, e.g., BASIc DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (L. Sohn &
T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
" Rosenblum, Terror in Argentina, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 28, 1976, at 26. It is
clear from Rosenblum's report that computerized information systems, and time- and datasharing, have introduced a new element of bureaucratic rationality in the pursuit of suspected
guerrillas, terrorists, and subversives across the entire South American continent.
In FY 76 legislation, the United States Congress terminated all military assistance, loans
or grants, and commercial sales to Chile because of gross violations of human rights; while
for FY 77, the Ford Administration did not even seek renewed military assistance to Chile.
Likewise, Congress acted this year to block military aid to Uruguay.
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cret police apparatus-SAVAK-has grown to 20,000 agents
(200,000 if one includes "part-timers"), many of them trained by
the United States." In Thailand, an ultra-conservative military
coup crushed incipient democracy and overturned constitutionalism. In South Korea, President Park's strong-armed repression of
poets and Protestants continued. And in the Republic of South
Africa, the white regime's response to the Soweto uprising has been
the expansion of preventive detention legislation, heightened police
brutality, and tokenism. These stark facts raise a disturbing possibility. That is, one cannot focus on the pro-human rights actors
alone, isolated from the systemic context. For, if in one sense we can
document heightened attention to human rights and expanded activities on behalf of human rights, in another sense the world political system may have moved towards intensified repression. To illustrate, if the universe of the world political prisoner population has
increased dramatically in the past decade, then an organization
devoted to the release of such "prisoners of conscience" can exhibit
increasing numerical "success" yet with no net change in the human
rights situation. The whole system has moved from "slack" to
"taut" with increasing potential resources available for politics,
more of them devoted to politics, and these more efficiently exploited-on both sides of human rights conflicts.
Yet, there is enough evidence of lives saved, prisoners freed, oppressors tumbled from power, to sustain the efforts of these activists. Moreover, the International League, as one of a tiny handful
of human rights NGOs, has operated successfully as a catalyst of
others and in ad hoc coalition-building in defense of threatened
rights. In the near term, while the key activists are rather dubious
of the net gains achieved by moving in the direction of a mass
membership organization," one can expect them to build further
,1 Baraheni, Terror in Iran, NEw YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 28, 1976, at 21; Baraheni,
Persia Today, No Magic Carpet Ride, MATCHBOX, Fall 1976, at 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
BRIEFING: IRAN (1976); W. BUTLER & G. LEVASSEUR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN

IRAN (International Commission of Jurists 1976).
," Before moving toward a mass membership organization, the League would want to make
a thorough study of both the feasibility and desirability of such a plan. However, League
officials are intuitively inclined against an organizational strategy of this sort. That is, they
do not feel that a mass organization can effectively respond to the entire array of human rights
that the League deals with. Additionally, they seem to feel that the League gains more by
attracting members and supporters with high status and visibility than by indiscriminate
numerical growth.
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upon the experiment with the Lawyers' Committee for International
Human Rights (which would help them define a unique role), and
to cooperate further in the building of a human rights movement.
Indeed, at the present time, there are stirrings in Washington and
New York toward the creation of a permanent coalition on human
rights,48 which may crystallize into a form of the "Leadership Conference," which guided the successful civil rights legislation of the
1960's. The International League for Human Rights will obviously
want to associate with these new strivings.
,1 This year, for example, a Human Rights Working Group was established in Washington,
a group brought together through the initiative of Jacqui Chagnon, of Clergy and Laity
Concerned, and which seeks to "coordinate" the efforts of some 30 organizations concerned
with international human rights issues.

